A recent congressional investigation has uncovered that Chinese-manufactured ship-to-shore cranes installed at U.S. ports contained technological backdoors, including cellular modems, which pose significant security risks. The 51-page report, spearheaded by the House Select Committee on China and the House Homeland Security Committee, revealed that these modems were neither requested by U.S. ports nor outlined in their contracts, raising concerns about potential unauthorized data collection and the integrity of critical port infrastructure.
The report highlighted that these modems, which were connected to Linux-based computers within the cranes, allowed for the collection of usage data from certain equipment. This constitutes a serious backdoor vulnerability that could undermine U.S. port operations by bypassing firewalls and potentially disrupting the flow of goods and materials.
Lawmakers further disclosed that several contracts allowed critical internal crane components to be sourced from third-party contractors and then sent to the Chinese manufacturer, ZPMC, for installation. This outsourcing practice has heightened concerns about the integrity and security of U.S. port infrastructure, especially at a time when tensions between the U.S. and China are increasing, particularly regarding the potential for conflict over Taiwan.
While the report did not specify the exact nature of the modems or the extent of data collected, it emphasized that these devices were not necessary for the operation of the cranes and that their presence was obscured from U.S. technicians, who believed they were solely for diagnostics. The ability to bypass security measures could provide an entry point for more significant threats to U.S. national security.
In response to these findings, U.S. officials have called for increased investment in domestically produced cranes and port equipment to reduce reliance on Chinese manufacturers. Rob Silvers, the Department of Homeland Security undersecretary for policy, noted that the U.S. is working with Japan’s Matsui heavy industrials company to establish domestic production of ship-to-shore cranes, which would secure a reliable, homegrown supply chain for critical hardware.
This report amplifies long-standing concerns about China’s influence over U.S. critical infrastructure, underscoring the importance of ensuring that key equipment—especially at strategic points such as ports—is free from foreign control and potential security breaches.

