Former U.S. Army Sergeant Sentenced for Attempting to Deliver National Defense Information to China

A former U.S. Army Sergeant who once held access to Top Secret military intelligence at Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM) has been sentenced to four years in federal prison and three years of supervised release for attempting to provide sensitive national defense information to the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Joseph Daniel Schmidt, 31, pleaded guilty in June 2025 to two federal felonies — attempt to deliver national defense information and retention of national defense information — in one of the most serious breaches of military oath to reach sentencing this year.

U.S. District Judge John C. Coughenour imposed the sentence based on both the gravity of Schmidt’s conduct and his mental health condition at the time. The court weighed his admitted intent to deliver classified data to Chinese intelligence against his post-service mental decline and erratic travel history between Turkey, Hong Kong, and mainland China.

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From Military Intelligence to Defection Attempt

According to federal court filings, Schmidt served on active duty from January 2015 to January 2020, assigned primarily to the 109th Military Intelligence Battalion at JBLM. His role granted him continuous access to SECRET and TOP SECRET systems — including network schematics, access devices, and encrypted communications linked to the Department of Defense’s intelligence infrastructure.

Following his separation from service, Schmidt initiated contact with the Chinese Consulate in Turkey before directly reaching out to the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) by email, offering classified information in exchange for relocation and employment within China.

By March 2020, Schmidt had traveled to Hong Kong, where he began drafting lengthy documents describing what he called “high-level secrets” available for sale to the PRC. Among the items he offered was a secure-network access device used by U.S. military personnel — an act prosecutors said was designed to help Chinese authorities infiltrate restricted defense systems.

Just seventeen days after his overture to Chinese intelligence, Schmidt was granted a long-desired work visa to China, suggesting early interest or operational coordination.

He resided in Hong Kong until October 2023, when he abruptly flew to San Francisco, where federal agents arrested him upon arrival.

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Prosecution: “A Calculated Betrayal”

Assistant U.S. Attorney Todd Greenberg stated in court that Schmidt “used his training to create documents derived from classified and national defense information.” Prosecutors revealed that Schmidt performed web searches such as “Can you be extradited for treason?” — underscoring that his actions were deliberate, not impulsive.

“These are not the decisions of a confused veteran,” Greenberg said. “They are the actions of someone who knew the value of what he held and chose to offer it to an adversary.”

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U.S. Officials Condemn the Breach

“As a retired Army officer, I find it unconscionable for a former soldier to put his colleagues and country at risk by peddling secret information and intelligence access to a hostile foreign power,” said U.S. Attorney Charles Neil Floyd, emphasizing that insider betrayal remains one of the most corrosive threats to national security.

FBI Seattle Special Agent in Charge W. Mike Herrington echoed the sentiment:

“Instead of upholding the trust placed in him, Schmidt betrayed it by handing over classified information to China. The FBI and our partners remain vigilant to uncover and prosecute anyone who endangers this nation’s security.”

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National Security Context

The case highlights a rising pattern of individual-level intelligence targeting by Chinese agencies against former Western military personnel, often using psychological vulnerability and financial instability as leverage points.
Intelligence analysts note that the MSS and affiliated PRC security organs have expanded their recruitment efforts through academic, business, and consular fronts in recent years — with a particular focus on technical specialists and ex-military contractors.

Schmidt’s approach through the Chinese Consulate in Turkey mirrors similar attempts in other cases where U.S. or allied personnel sought relocation to China in exchange for defense-related access.

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Investigation and Aftermath

The FBI led the investigation with support from the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Command, reconstructing Schmidt’s encrypted communications and travel trail between Turkey, Hong Kong, and the mainland.

Prosecutors confirmed that while Schmidt claimed mental health issues after leaving the Army, his actions — including drafting classified summaries, retaining digital credentials, and seeking contact with PRC intelligence — represented “a knowing and intentional breach of duty.”

His conviction under the Espionage Act provisions of Title 18, U.S. Code § 793(d) and § 793(e), marks one of the rare cases in recent years where a former enlisted soldier was prosecuted for directly attempting to aid a foreign power rather than passing information domestically or online.

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TRJ Analysis

The Schmidt case underscores how modern espionage rarely begins with ideology — it often begins with disillusionment, isolation, or desperation.
But the result is the same: the weaponization of access and the exploitation of trust.

The sentence — four years — may appear modest compared to Cold War precedents, but its symbolic weight is substantial: a signal that intent alone, when paired with classified access, constitutes a threat to the state.

For the defense community, it reinforces an uncomfortable truth: even a single compromised credential or misplaced loyalty can bridge the gap between national defense and adversarial exploitation.

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